Background. The variability in risk tolerance in medicine is not well understood. Parallels are often drawn between aviation and anaesthesia. The aviation industry is perceived as culturally risk averse, and part of preflight checks involves a decision on whether the flight can operate. This is sometimes termed a go/no-go decision. This questionnaire study was undertaken to explore the equivalent go/no-go decision in anaesthesia. We presented anaesthetists with a range of situations in which additional risk might be expected and asked them to decide whether they would proceed with the case.
20% of surgical operations start with either faulty or missing equipment. 6 Guidelines on topics such as minimum monitoring standards, 7 checking anaesthetic equipment, 8 and fatigue 9 are widely available and should assist 'go/no-go' decision-making in theatre. It is not clear that these are always strictly adhered to, and few data exist as to how staff balance risks in adverse situations against the need to maintain adequate productivity, nor how much variability occurs between practitioners. Health-care guidelines are generally advisory and not necessarily equivalent to the much stricter standards in place in other safety-critical industries. Health-care providers aspire to become high-reliability organizations, but this practice contrasts with existing high-reliability organizations, such as aviation, where decision-making aids and standardized operating procedures are widely used. This study was designed to assess the extent of departure from guidelines and the variability between anaesthetists in risk tolerance.
Methods
The study was approved by the University of Oxford Central Research Ethics Committee (MS-IDREC-C1-2015-21). All subjects gave consent before participation. Data were collected by online questionnaire throughout a 2 week period. All 212 anaesthetists [125 consultant and staff/ associate specialist (SAS) doctors, and 87 trainees] working with Oxford University Hospitals National Health Service Foundation Trust received the invitation to participate via their departmental administrators. Clinicians were approached by email and were also free to pass on the invitation to interested colleagues.
Eleven scenarios were presented (Table 1) , each with a different potential hazard. These scenarios were developed by review of critical incident data available within our department and via the Royal College of Anaesthetists Safe Anaesthesia Liaison Group quarterly bulletins. Scenarios were selected to reflect a range of clinical situations in which guidelines, standards, or protocols variably apply. Scenario design also included patient input. Scenarios were piloted with a small group of respondents and refined before study commencement.
After reading each scenario, participants were asked to decide whether they would proceed with the case using a fourpoint Likert scale, and then invited to leave free-text responses expanding upon their decision. Participants were also asked whether they would expect a colleague with similar experience to make the same decision in each instance.
Quantitative data were compared by either independentsamples t test (continuous variables) or v 2 (proportional variables). Qualitative data were analysed by thematic analysis.
Results
In total, 59 anaesthetists responded to the survey. This yielded an estimated response rate of 28%. Responses were received from 41 consultants and 18 trainees. Consultants had a mean age of 48 (range 35-64) yr, and had practised for a mean of 20 (9-38) yr. Trainees were younger, with a mean age of 35 (25-42) yr, and had practised for a mean of 5.9 (1-11) yr. Participant age and years of practice were normally distributed for both consultant/SAS respondents and trainees. There was considerable variation in anaesthetists' decisions to proceed in suboptimal conditions. In scenarios 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, and 11 there is a clear majority decision, but in others there appears little consensus. Scenario decisions are summarized in Table 2 . Consultants were more willing to proceed with cases under adverse circumstances than trainees [204 of 308 total responses (66%) vs 64/174 (37%), P¼0.001], but no anaesthetist would proceed in all circumstances, and neither would any Editor's key points
• Variability in risk tolerance occurs in medicine, but its impact on quality and safety in anaesthesia is poorly understood.
• An electronic questionnaire at a single UK centre was used to study decision-making by anaesthetists.
• There was wide variability in decision-making amongst anaesthetists even against accepted guidelines, indicating that there remain opportunities for improvements in safety. This high level of agreement was true even where the decision appeared contentious. The expectation of agreement did not differ significantly between consultants and trainees (P¼0.848). Anaesthetists appear to believe that there is a consensus on whether to proceed in instances with clear additional risks, whereas in fact there is considerable variability.
Four main themes developed from the explanatory free-text responses given by participants: procedure severity/urgency; concern for patient well-being; previous experience of similar situations; and external pressures. Sample quotations from scenario responses are provided in Table 2 .
Concern for patient well-being incorporated two dimensions. In several scenarios, anaesthetists cited risk of physical harm as justification for 'no-go' decisions; however, concern for the patient was also a factor in some 'go' decisions. Several respondents highlighted the inconvenience of rescheduling an operation for the patient, raising issues such as time off work or difficulties in arranging childcare.
External pressures affecting anaesthetists' decisions came from three main sources: the legal system; need to maintain throughput; and anaesthetic colleagues. Many noted concern for the legal implications or risk of adverse publicity associated with their decision, some noting that [a decision to proceed] 'fails my stand up in court test' [Consultant; 10 yr of experience] or would 'fail the Daily Mail test' [Consultant; 21 yr of experience]. There were also concerns for operational efficiency, and although no anaesthetist expressly suggested that pressure might come from hospital management, there were concerns that 'the service would collapse [if procedures were routinely cancelled over a particular issue]' [Consultant; 25 yr of experience]. Finally, some offered insight into working culture, noting that sometimes the expectation of proceeding with cases would come from colleagues, and situations were described where an anaesthetist would proceed in situations they perceived as risky over concern that cancellation would be judged critically by colleagues.
Discussion
Both professional staff and health-care organizations generally state that safety is the top priority. 10 Our findings suggest that this is not universally true and that operational and other factors play important roles when weighing the decision to anaesthetize. The scenarios were written using real critical incident data, chosen to represent a breadth of situations in which standards and policies variously apply. Senior doctors were willing to proceed in more than two-thirds of elective procedures under suboptimal conditions. Even in scenarios where national guidelines are absolutely clear that the case should not go ahead, some senior anaesthetists were willing to proceed. Most of the respondents in scenario 1 (faulty gas analyser) predictably decided to cancel the case, generally making reference to the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland (AAGBI) Minimum Monitoring Standards 7 not being met. In this instance, the AAGBI standards state 'an oxygen analyser . . . is essential during anaesthesia . . . the same monitoring standards apply when the anaesthetist is responsible for a local/regional anaesthetic or sedative technique for an operative procedure'. In this scenario, both the vapour analyser and oxygen analyser had failed, and a universal 'no-go' decision was expected. However, a minority (eight of 57) elected to proceed, explicitly acknowledging that this would vary from best practice. Almost all of those who would go ahead with the anaesthetic suggested that a total i.v. anaesthetic technique could still be offered safely. In many instances, the decision to proceed, for both 'go' and 'no-go' choices, was influenced by experience of similar situations. Some reported they had attempted to proceed under such circumstances and regretted it, others that they had managed a similar situation sufficiently well in the past and so did not perceive the risk to be high. This was particularly true in the scenario of the missing ultrasound (scenario 8), because many senior respondents trained before widespread adoption of ultrasound guidance; some also noted that they had learned to administer anaesthesia before such gas analysers were available.
It is striking that, while there was considerable variability in decision-making, anaesthetists tended to believe that their own actions reflected a wider professional consensus. This effect might explain why, in scenario 1, most anaesthetists (n¼49) would cancel the procedure, but of the eight who would proceed, five expected a colleague with similar experience to do the same. It is likely that these data reflect a well-documented cognitive bias entitled the 'false consensus effect'. 11 First described in the late 1970s, the effect describes the common finding that people expect their own opinions to be representative of their peer group, even when they are not. 12 13 The expectation that others would act in a similar manner has been previously found to contribute to anaesthetists' views on the acceptability of deviating from guidelines.
14 Factors commonly identified by respondents included procedure urgency (emergency procedures were less likely to be cancelled), inconvenience caused by cancellation (to both the patient and hospital), experience, and external pressures. The importance placed on maintenance of throughput, particularly in scenario 7 [lack of intensive care unit (ICU) bed], merits further consideration. The anaesthetist has necessarily a narrow view of organizational performance, being based in a single theatre in a single operating suite, and may not have oversight of events occurring elsewhere. Many anaesthetists who wished to proceed in this scenario made suggestions for alternatives to ICU care; these included a prolonged stay in the recovery area or special nursing in the ward environment. Although ensuring that the procedure was completed with provision for patient observation afterwards, none reported consideration of the implications on service delivery in the affected areas. This is a phenomenon observed previously, where it was recognized that clinicians generally try to maximize their personal efficiency, but often with unintended costs to overall unit performance. 15 16 Consultants appeared more sensitive to these organizational issues than trainees, reflecting perhaps the fact that they bear ultimate responsibility for the patient's care and are more directly answerable to Trust management for productivity. Consultants are also role models for their juniors. Observation of senior colleagues is an important part of the 'hidden curriculum' in medical education, and we observed disagreement over what constitutes professional practice; even within the same scenarios, there were diametrically opposed viewpoints, each stated with equal strength. This was particularly evident in scenarios dealing with illness and fatigue, but also seen in the scenarios addressing a cold theatre environment, missing ultrasound, and lack of postoperative ICU bed. Inconsistency in a department over what is considered professional (or even acceptable) practice may increase pressure and uncertainty amongst trainees.
Concerns were raised by some over how colleagues might perceive them when describing their response to fatigue and illness. The AAGBI guidelines on fatigue highlight particular risks associated with on-call duties impinging on elective work, especially for the older anaesthetist. There is ample evidence that disrupted rest patterns adversely affect performance in health-care settings, 9 and tiredness is a well-recognized contributor to aviation accidents. 17 Tiredness can have effects comparable to intoxication. 18 It would be unthinkable to attempt to practise under the influence of alcohol, but it was judged as acceptable (or even expected) to work when fatigued. The General Medical Council makes it clear that it expects doctors to act 'if [they] think that safety . . . is or may be seriously compromised' and take appropriate steps if 'inadequate premises, equipment, or other resources, policies or systems' compromise care. 19 Doctors have a duty to consider conditions that might affect their practice and should not rely on self-assessment. This may be particularly relevant when considering fatigue, where it is recognized that selfassessment of performance impairment is poor. 20 These findings yield insights into the variability in risk tolerance between anaesthetists, but there are potential limitations in a study such as this. This method of data collection captures 'work as described', rather than 'work as done'. The most robust method of assessing these decisions would be to observe them directly in clinical practice; however, the relative infrequency of many of these events (and the likelihood that the act of observation would affect outcome) makes this impractical. It seems likely, given the wide variability in decisions made and some of the detailed free-text responses, that our cohort were thoughtful and honest in their answers. The response rate to the survey was only 28%, but this is within the bounds that would be predicted for a survey of this type, 21 and it does not appear from the data that the responses are systematically biased. Standards are conventionally defined as 'authoritative statements that articulate minimal, acceptable or excellent levels of performance'. 22 Guidelines, in contrast, are 'statements of principle or procedures that assist professionals in ensuring quality', 22 and function more to describe best practice. 28 After the Challenger accident, the culture at NASA was described as: 'launch constraints were often waived after developing a rationale for accepting the problem rather than correcting the problem; moreover, this rationale was not always based on sound engineering or scientific principles'. 27 A number of other potential sources of bias may be relevant to 'go/no-go' decisions. 29 30 These biases are natural and universal, and all clinicians are vulnerable to them. In flight operations, this pressure to proceed in spite of identifiable risk has been described as 'go fever' 31 or 'get-there-itis', 32 and has led to serious accidents. 33 Studies examining this risk-taking behaviour have noted that pilots are more likely to make 'risky' decisions when nearer their destination airport, when running behind schedule or overnight, or if another aircraft has made the same decision ahead of them. 34 Such violations can become routine and automatic, with practitioners not necessarily even aware that their actions constitute risk. There is a 'normative pressure' 35 to conform to the usual workplace culture, and if that culture is perceived to tolerate risk, then it is likely that new staff will adapt to that practice. The use of explicit go/no-go standards in aviation and other industries is a recognition both that individual decisions are vulnerable to bias and a variety of other influences and, of equal importance, that greater safety can be achieved by a wider professional and organizational decision not to proceed unless circumstances are optimal. 29 The findings of the present study raise much larger questions that go well beyond the question of individual decision-making. Anaesthetists often have to work in suboptimal conditions and become accustomed to this and experienced at adapting. In emergencies this is admirable, but in elective procedures it has the effect of perpetuating a wider failure of healthcare organizations to maintain reliable supply processes and functioning equipment. For patients, it must seem little short of incredible that any elective operation can begin without the proper equipment in place. We believe that if anaesthetists, and ideally all surgical teams, adopted stricter go/no-go standards it would have a beneficial effect on the immediate decisions of professionals and increase safety. However, the more important effect would be to draw attention to the background inefficiency of health-care organizations and the willingness to continue to treat patients in unsafe conditions. Individual anaesthetists naturally find it difficult to challenge their employing organization, and so this issue requires a wider professional debate. Although it may not be possible to gain a full understanding of the variability in practice based on this sample, the substantial differences in opinion observed illustrate an important potential source of risk. Risk is inevitable in complex environments such as health care, and overall anaesthetic mortality has improved more than 10-fold since the 1970s, currently estimated to be 1 in 40 000. 36 This is a significant achievement, but it is noteworthy that the Health and Safety Executive consider a workplace risk of death as low 1 in 1 000 000 as the point at which no further safety intervention is required. 37 Although the improvements in anaesthetic safety are impressive, we believe that there are further steps we can take to achieve truly safe anaesthesia. This will initially require a serious professional consensus in the surgical, anaesthesia, and nursing professions about go/no-go standards, followed by a wider engagement of health-care managers and organizations in an effort to challenge the current assumptions that production pressure can override safety and that it is acceptable to anaesthetize patients with missing or faulty equipment. Until then, the statement that safety is our top priority cannot be taken seriously.
